Crisis And Compensation

Why does Japan, with its efficiency-oriented technocracy, periodically adopt welfare-oriented, economically inefficient domestic policies? In answering this question Kent Calder shows that Japanese policymakers respond to threats to the ruling party's preeminence by extending income compensation, entitlements, and subsidies, with market-oriented retrenchment coming as crisis subsides. "Quite simply the most ambitious and strongly argued interpretation of a key dimension of Japanese political life to appear in English this decade."--David Williams, Japan Times "Historically dense and conceptually rich.... [Forces] readers' attention to the domestic underpinnings of Japanese foreign policy."--Donald S. Zagoria, Foreign Affairs "Punctures the myth of Japan Inc. as a cool, rational monolith...."--Kathleen Newland, Millennium "A bold reinterpretation of Japanese politics that will force us to rethink many of our current assumptions and will influence our research agenda."--Steven R. Reed, Journal of Japanese Studies

This important book discusses the issue of executive compensation in Anglo-American financial markets following the financial crisis. The book begins by contextualizing the problem facing financial institutions in the US and the UK and argues that appr

This report argues that any new approaches to public sector pay must help to: enhance external competitiveness of salaries; promote internal equity throughout the public sector; reflect the values of public organisations; and align compensation with government’s core strategic objectives.

Japan grew explosively and consistently for more than a century, from the Meiji Restoration until the collapse of the economic bubble in the early 1990s. Since then, it has been unable to restart its economic engine and respond to globalization. How could the same political–economic system produce such strongly contrasting outcomes? This book identifies the crucial variables as classic Japanese forms of socio-political organization: the "circles of compensation." These cooperative groupings of economic, political, and bureaucratic interests dictate corporate and individual responses to such critical issues as investment and innovation; at the micro level, they explain why individuals can be decidedly cautious on their own, yet prone to risk-taking as a collective. Kent E. Calder examines how these circles operate in seven concrete areas, from food supply to consumer electronics, and deals in special detail with the influence of Japan's changing financial system. The result is a comprehensive overview of Japan's circles of compensation as they stand today, and a road map for broadening them in the future.

By looking at the three most recent economic crises, the S&L crisis, the dot-com bubble, and the recent subprime mortgage disaster, the author explains why and how corporate managers led their organizations toward disasters in the long-run.

Workers' compensation was arguably the first widespread social insurance program in the United States and the most successful form of labor legislation to emerge from the early Progressive Movement. Adopted in most states between 1910 and 1920, workers' compensation laws have been paving seen as the way for social security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, and eventually the broad network of social welfare programs we have today. In this highly original and persuasive work, Price V. Fishback and Shawn Everett Kantor challenge widespread historical perceptions, arguing that, rather than being an early progressive victory, workers' compensation succeeded because all relevant parties—labor and management, insurance companies, lawyers, and legislators—benefited from the legislation. Thorough, rigorous, and convincing, A Prelude to the Welfare State: The Origins of Workers' Compensation is a major reappraisal of the causes and consequences of a movement that ultimately transformed the nature of social insurance and the American workplace.

Making use of unique balanced panel data for the German chemical sector from the years 2008 to 2011, we explore the extent to which managers' compensation was affected by the economic crisis and the extent to which it increased afterwards. Carrying out longitudinal analyses, we find that, on average, bonus payments (in contrast to fixed salaries) decrease considerably during the crisis. The economic upturn in 2011 then leads to an average increase in variable payments and total compensation to even above the pre-crisis level. Changes in bonus payments are negatively correlated over time. We find considerable differences across employees with respect to changes in bonus payments. Fixed salary changes are much more homogeneous over the period of crisis.We explore determinants of compensation changes and find that changes in compensation have a strong relationship with employees' age, firm size and hierarchical level. Our findings hint at the relevance of an incentive perspective. We also examine that certain parts of managers seem to have more power to influence their compensation than others. Inequality in managers' compensation decreased during the crisis.

Popular perceptions of executive compensation in the United States are now part of a full-blown mythology fueled by critics who have little direct experience with the inner workings of corporations, their boards, and the executive teams who ultimately shoulder the responsibility for business success or failure. This book documents the realities of executive compensation by investigating the extent to which the pay for performance model governs executive pay levels. It also assesses the relative success of this model in creating value for shareholders and robust job growth for U.S. workers and provides detailed, real-world guidance for designing and executing effective executive compensation plans. Based on extensive empirical research and decades of direct experience in the field, Myths and Realities of Executive Pay settles the debate about executive compensation and the role it plays in the broader U.S. economy.

On October 20, 2009 Brady Dougan, the CEO of Credit Suisse Group, announced a new compensation plan for the bank. The announcement had followed quickly on the heels of the G-20 meeting the prior month where, in the wake of the financial crisis, the major governments had laid out a set of guidelines for compensation in the financial industry. Credit Suisse Group was the first firm to adopt the G-20 guidelines, and did so a year ahead of the suggested timetable. While responsive to the concerns of regulators and politicians, Credit Suisse's program was more than a knee-jerk reaction, the new compensation plan had been the result of a "10 year journey" to reshape the culture of the firm. After a significant investment of senior leadership time to explain the new program to employees a significant new challenge arose. On December 9, the U.K. government announced they would impose a one-time 50% tax on bankers' bonuses greater than 25,000 pounds. Dougan and the executive team had to decide how best to fund this tax. Was it fair or appropriate to have the shareholders shoulder the burden of the tax? Similarly, was it fair to ask the UK employees to suffer relative to their peers in other countries?

The recent financial crisis has created a public outcry over top-executive pay packages and has led to calls for reform of executive pay in Europe and the US. The current controversy is not the first - nor will it be the last - time that executive compensation has sparked outrage and led to regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. This volume compares US and European CEOs to trace the evolution of executive compensation, its controversies and its resulting regulations. It shows that many features of current executive compensation practices reflect the, often-unintended, consequences of regulatory responses to perceived abuses in top-executive pay, which frequently stem from relatively isolated events or situations. Regulation creates unintended (and usually costly) side effects and it is often driven by political agendas rather than shareholder value. Improvements in executive compensation are more likely to come from stronger corporate governance, and not through direct government intervention. The volume also examines the effects of incentive schemes and the patterns of performance related pay both within and across countries. It documents a number of empirical regularities and discusses whether government should intervene to support the implementation of incentive pay schemes. It argues that it makes little sense to undertake reform without detailed simulations of the effect on the economy under alternative economic scenarios, based on sound analysis and extensive discussion with labour, management, and government decision-makers.